



Occupational Regulation in the European Union: 
Coverage and Wage Effects 
 
We present the first EU-wide study on the prevalence and labour market impact of occupational 
regulation in the EU. Drawing on a new EU Survey of Regulated Occupations, we find that 
licensing affects about 22 percent of workers in the EU, although there is significant variability 
across member states and occupations. On average, licensing is associated with a 4 percent 
higher hourly wages.  Using decomposition techniques, we show that rent capture accounts for 
one third of this effect and the remaining is attributed to signalling. We find considerable 
heterogeneity in the wage gains by occupation and level of educational attainment. Finally, 
occupational licensing increases wage inequality. After accounting for composition effects, 
licensing increases the standard deviation of wages by about 0.02 log points.  
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Occupational regulation is a labour market institution that has attracted considerable debate 
within academic and policy cycles. The current policy interest derives from its potential to 
serve as a strong incentive for employers and workers to invest more heavily in skills and as a 
means to address information asymmetries. However, economists have also warned about the 
potentially negative labour market effects of regulation that can result from the rent-seeking 
activities of occupational groups (e.g. Maurizi 1974; Shapiro 1986). While there is now a well-
developed empirical literature in the US assessing the labour market outcomes of occupational 
regulation, the paucity of such evidence in the European context is striking. This is a surprising 
omission given that, as we shall show below, entry to a significant proportion of EU jobs is 
restricted through the imposition of minimum competency standards to lawfully practice for 
pay (known as licensing). As such, the importance of this labour market institution extends 
beyond academic curiosity and deserves more attention than it currently receives. Less 
common in empirical analyses is the study of the effect of certification. Certification offers 
practitioners the option to join a scheme that verifies that their skills meet certain standards. 
Contrary to licensing, while these schemes can signal competency, they do not impose any 
legal restrictions on the right to practice. Nevertheless, these gaps in the literature are not 
entirely unjustifiable. Since recently, researchers in Europe have lacked comprehensive data 
that identifies regulated individuals, the characteristics of the regulatory regime they are subject 
to and their individual and labour market characteristics. This paper addresses this gap. We 
explore the first ever EU Survey of Regulated Occupations (EU-SOR); a survey consisting of 
a representative sample that covers the labor force within the EU28 member states and asks 
detailed questions about occupational regulation. We are interested in three key themes: 
incidence of regulation in the EU labour market, its effect on wage determination and its effect 
on wage inequality.  
Prior to EU-SOR, researchers have been restricted to imputing the regulation status of a worker 
based on her reported occupation (e.g. Gittleman and Kleiner 2016; Koumenta et al. 2014). 
While informative, the precision of this procedure is likely to be compromised by the 
possibility that some of those classified as working in a licensed occupation are in fact not 
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licensed. For example, an engineer working in a multinational company in the automotive 
industry might not need to be licensed, although the engineering profession is generally subject 
to licensing. This highlights the difference between coverage and individual attainment of 
licensed status. Moreover, the codes commonly used to classify occupations do not necessarily 
describe licensed professions, as defined by licensing regulations. By explicitly asking the 
respondents to report their regulation status, EU-SOR enables us to address this measurement 
problem. In this paper, we contribute to the literature in three ways.  First, we provide the first 
ever EU estimates of the prevalence of occupational regulation in the EU and estimate the wage 
premium associated with licensing (the most restrictive form of regulation) and certification 
(its less restrictive counterpart). Second, we decompose the wage premium using the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition and in doing so, provide more systematic estimates of the wage gap 
between licensed and non-licensed workers than currently available in the extant literature. 
Third, we contribute to a less well-developed line of enquiry in the study of occupational 
regulation, namely the impact of licensing on the wage distribution. We do so using the Di 
Nardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) decomposition method, which is itself a new approach to 
estimating such effects within the occupational regulation field.  Throughout our analysis, we 
compare our findings with those in the US, where the literature is more advanced, to establish 
any differences or similarities between these two labour market contexts.  
 
2. Related Literature 
Entry requirements associated with licensing regulate the supply and deployment of labour in 
the market. This is achieved in two ways. First, entry to the occupation is restricted to those 
practitioners whose skills or character are above the minimum requirements. Second, regulators 
may revoke the license if performance of incumbents is deemed to fall short of meeting the 
professional standards. The implication of these arrangements is that the entry requirements 
associated with licensing reduces the pool of practitioners thus potentially creating monopoly 
rents within the occupation (Pagliero 2013; 2011; 2010). As such, the wage effect of regulation 
is borne by the artificial creation of entry barriers in the occupation, as opposed to the standard 
human capital returns in the labour market. Research on the wage effect of regulation has a 
relatively long tradition, but improvements in measurement have resulted in two empirical 
developments: (i) better estimations of the wage premium associated with licensing (ii) 
detection of potential differential effects of licensing on wage determination by occupation.  
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With regards to the former, using a self-reported measure of regulation status, Kleiner and 
Krueger (2013) find its effect on wages to be around the 11% mark in the US. Gittleman and 
Kleiner (2016) exploit the introduction of questions on occupational regulation in large-scale 
national surveys. Using longitudinal data and a rich set of labour market controls, they find 
wage effects considerably lower than previous estimates (of about 7.5%).  Further, early studies 
present licensing as having a homogeneous wage effect, without any differentiation by 
occupation or licensing regimes.  More recently, researchers have considered the possibility of 
heterogeneity in the effect of licensing on wages. According to Kleiner (2013), the ability of 
occupations to capture rents depends on factors associated with the political economy of the 
regulatory regime, such as the strictness of entry barriers or the amount of time the occupation 
has been subject to regulation. Indeed empirically, it has not been  uncommon to observe 
occupational variations on the wage effect of licensing.  For example, Timmons and Thornton 
use a cross-state U.S. survey of radiologic technologists and find the wage effect of licensing 
to be 6.9% (Timmons and Thornton 2007), while the same figure for massage therapists stands 
at 16.2 % (Timmons and Thornton 2013). In his comparison of average incomes across licensed 
and non-licensed occupations, Kleiner (2000) calculates the licensing premium among dentists, 
and lawyers vis-à-vis other comparable occupations. Despite many similarities in the 
educational licensing requirements for dentists and lawyers, the wage effect is 30% for the 
former and 10% for the later. In the UK context too, Koumenta et al. (2014) find significant 
variations in the wage premium amongst dentists, pharmacists, accountants, architects, security 
guards, teachers and plumbers (ranging from 9% to 19%). Although these studies allude to 
potential heterogeneity in the effect of licensing on wages, they fall short of a systematic 
examination by occupational classification. Finally, our data source enables us to go even 
further in understanding the effect of regulation in the labour market by examining its effect 
on returns to education. Does licensing create a distortion in the returns to education and if so, 
how does this pattern vary by the level of educational attainment?   
Less common in the literature is the study of the impact of licensing on different parts of the 
income distribution. Licensing can result in the creation of rents through the monopoly effect 
discussed above. If they are unequally distributed amongst income groups, economic rents can 
aggravate income inequality, such that those at the top of the income distribution fare better 
than those at the bottom. Empirically, such a line of enquiry parallels the study of the effect of 
unionism (another labour market institution associated with rent-capture) on wage dispersion. 
For example, in his classic work on the effects of unions, Freeman (1991) finds that despite the 
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inequality-increasing effect of unions on the difference between union members and non-
members, the overall effect of unions on income inequality is negative. Does licensing have a 
similar effect on wage dispersion?  Recent analyses by Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and 
Gittleman and Kleiner (2016) for example find that licensing does not reduce wage dispersion 
in the US labour market.  
As a policy alternative to licensing, certification is less restrictive in that it presents consumers 
with a choice between practitioners whose credentials have been vetted by the state or a 
professional body. In theory, we would expect its effect on wages to depend on the 
restrictiveness of the entry criteria pertaining the certification regime, the extent to which 
consumers are willing to pay a premium for practitioners meeting these standards and the 
degree to which state involvement in its operation entails rigorous vetting of applicants and 
monitoring of standards (Forth et al. 2011). In the US, Gittleman et al. (2018) estimate that 
certified workers earn approximately 7.5% higher wages than their unlicensed and uncertified 
counterparts, while Kleiner and Krueger (2013) find positive but not statistically significant 
coefficients for certification in their various specifications.  
 
3. The survey and the sample 
The data used for this study is based on the EU-SOR, the first ever survey commissioned by 
the European Commission dedicated to capturing the extent of occupational regulation in the 
EU. The questionnaire items are drawn from questions successfully tested in the US-based 
Westat survey of regulated occupations (Kleiner and Krueger 2013), and further developed to 
suit the specific research context. To test the final instrument, a pilot study was carried out 
which suggested some revisions to the questionnaire, including shortening its length and some 
minor adjustments to the item wording.  
The survey covers the civilian population of the respective nationalities of the EU member 
states, resident in each of the 28 member states, aged 15 years and over who at the time were 
working or looking for a job. The survey was carried out in the period between March to April 
2015 by means of telephone interviews (Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews) using a 
multi-stage random probability sample design. In every country, respondents were called on 
fixed lines and mobile phones, and in each household the respondent was drawn at random 
following the ‘last birthday rule’.  
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 A total of 26,640 individuals were interviewed providing data on their regulation status, the 
characteristics of the regulation regime (e.g. entry and renewal requirements), as well as 
detailed information on a variety of individual characteristics.i  The data has several important 
strengths for our analysis. In addition to providing us with a self-reported measure of the 
regulation status of the individual, the large sample size increases the external validity and 
precision of our estimates, while the breadth of information about individuals and their labour 
market circumstances improves our ability to control for observable heterogeneity that might 
be correlated with regulation status and earnings.  
The response rate was 28%. The response rate is higher than the 17.9% obtained by Westat, its 
American counterpart (Kleiner and Krueger 2013), analogous to that of commercial surveys 
and in a context of declining response rates to telephone surveys (see for example Curtin et al. 
2005) overall very satisfactory. We proceed to examine the credibility of our data by comparing 
the mean proportion of respondents in the EU-SOR with those reported in the EU Labour Force 
Survey (EULFS) for the same year (Table 1). In Column 3, we estimate the difference in the 
means across a range of indicators relating to individual and labour market characteristics. 
Differences are below 1 percent for gender, age, and employment type groups. However, the 
EU-SOR sample includes 4 percent less workers with secondary education and 6 percent more 
with tertiary education than the Eurostat data. Differences by industry are below 1 percent for 
agriculture and public administration, but the EU-SOR data covers a larger proportion of 
workers in education and health, and finance and professional services, and a smaller 
proportion of workers in the trade industry. Differences by occupation are below 1 percent for 
technicians, clerical support workers, and craft workers, but the EU-SOR data includes a larger 
proportion of managers and professionals, and a smaller proportion of service and sales 
workers, skilled agricultural workers, plant and machine operators, and workers in elementary 
occupations.  
We repeat the same exercise in relation to earnings. Respondents in our survey are asked to 
provide an estimate of their net monthly earnings from their main paid job (converted to euros 
at the current exchange rate where necessary) and the number of hours of work in a typical 
week. The number of hours is recorded as less than 15 hours per week, then in 5-hour intervals 
up to 45, with the last category corresponding to more than 45 hours. We compute the hourly 
net wage by dividing the reported wage by the estimated number of hours worked in a month 
(4.35*the midpoint of each category of weekly hours worked).  In Table 1(column 1), the mean 
annual net wage is computed for a hypothetical full time worker working 40 hours per week 
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and 52 weeks per year. The corresponding figure from Eurostat (column 2) is computed starting 
from gross wages and applying the average income tax for a single worker with average taxable 
income. The difference between the two calculations is about 5 percent. 
  
Table 1 about here 
Finally, in our estimates, we employ the survey weights that were developed by TNS (the 
organisation responsible for the implementation of the survey) to compensate for variation in 
selection probabilities and non-response bias.ii 
 
4. Methodology 
We estimate cross sectional wage regressions of the general form 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝐿𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑑𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖𝑏2 + 𝑢𝑖                                                                       (1) 
where Yi denotes the log hourly wage of worker i, the matrix Xi includes gender, education, 
union membership, work experience, working status, country, occupation, and industry fixed 
effects. The coefficient b1 measures the impact of the indicator variable Licensed, which 
measures whether worker i is subject to occupational licensing.  
This approach assumes that the impact of occupational regulation is uniform across 
occupations, and that regulation cannot affect the return to other individual characteristics (the 
vector b2). This assumption is restrictive, since regulation may affect differently workers in 
different occupations. Moreover, it may induce changes in the coefficients of other variables 
such as education or work experience. A more general model allows for different coefficients 
b1 and b2 for licensed and unlicensed workers.  
Individuals in the survey can be partitioned into two exclusive groups denoted by g=L, N. 
Individuals in group L are individuals who need a license to do their job, while those in group 
N do not. The coefficients from the group-specific wage regressions  
𝑌𝑔𝑖 = 𝛽𝑔0 + 𝑋𝑔𝑖𝛽𝑔1 + 𝑢𝑔𝑖                                                                (2) 
can be used to decompose the difference in average outcomes between group L and group N, 
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∆= 𝑌𝐿 − 𝑌𝑁 ,                                                                                 (3) 
into the part explained by differences in characteristics X across the two groups (∆𝑋), and the 
structural component (∆𝑆) that is due to differences in the coefficients 𝛽𝑔0 and 𝛽𝑔1 across the 
two groups, 
       ∆= ∆𝑋 + ∆𝑆                                                                                  (4) 
∆𝑋= (𝑋𝐿 − 𝑋𝑁)?̂?𝑁1  
∆𝑆= (?̂?𝐿0 − ?̂?𝑁0) + 𝑋𝐿(?̂?𝐿1 − ?̂?𝑁1). 
Hence, we can estimate by OLS the wage regressions (2) and then decompose the overall 
change in wages into what is driven by X, that is ∆𝑋, and what is driven by having a license, 
∆𝑆 (Oaxaca 1973 and Blinder 1973). More generally, one can decompose the entire distribution 
of wages and study the impact of licensing on any quantile of the wage distribution (DiNardo, 
Fortin and Lemieux 1996). 
Cross sectional wage regressions have the advantage of being representative of all occupations. 
However, they are based on the usual assumption that E(u|X)=0. Hence, they cannot account 
for unobserved characteristics that could be related to the selection into licensing occupations. 
Decomposition methods rely on the same assumption. They provide interesting descriptive 
results, which can be interpreted as causal only under this fairly strong assumption.  
 
5. The prevalence of occupational licensing 
The following two questions are used in the EU-SOR to classify workers into three groups: (i) 
licensed; (ii) certified (or accredited), and (iii) unregulated:  
“In addition to this education, do you have a professional certification, licence or did you 
have to take an exam which is required to practice your occupation?” 
 
Instructions to interviewees: “A professional certification or licence shows you are 
qualified to perform a specific job and may give you the right to enter a regulated 
profession or professional association.  
Instructions to interviewers: “Only include certifications or licences obtained by the 
respondent as an individual. Examples include "licensed medical doctor" and "licensed 




To distinguish between licensing and certification, those who answer 1 or 2 to the above 
question were then asked:  
 
 
A worker is classified as ‘licensed’ if she answers (1) or (2) in the first question and (2) in the 
second. A worker is classified as ‘certified’ if she answers (1) or (2) in the first question and 
(1) or (3) in the second, and ‘unregulated’ otherwise.  
To ensure the validity of the survey instrument we derived the key questions from the 
previously validated instrument used in the Westat survey in the US by Kleiner and Krueger 
(2013). Second, the questionnaire was subject to piloting in all EU28 member states and no 
issues were raised in relation to the questions on regulation status.  Further, it is encouraging 
that the ‘Don’t know/No answer’ responses are small, suggesting that respondents understood 
the questions. Finally, the proportion of missing values in the data is similar to that observed 
for other questions such as ‘economic activity of the firm or organization’ and ‘occupation’, 
again suggesting that the questions were well understood.  
 
1. Yes…………(39.65%) 
2. No – but currently in process of obtaining one…………. (0.95%) 
3. No…………. (59.21%) 
4. Don’t know/No answer ………(0.19%) 
 
 
“Without this professional certification, licence or exam would you be legally allowed to 
practice your occupation?” 
 
Instructions to the interviewer: Refer to the respondent's specific occupation and personal 
circumstances. Refer to the current laws and regulations affecting the respondent's 
occupation (current main paid job). 
 
1. Yes…………(45.19%) 
2. No………… (52.55%) 





We estimate that just under half (43%) of the EU workforce is subject to some form of 
regulation. In particular, 22% of workers are licensed (Table 2). The proportion of licensed 
workers in the EU is broadly comparable to the most recent US estimates where, depending on 
the data source, it ranges from 29% (Kleiner and Krueger 2013) to 20% (Gittleman et al. 2018), 
although the latter cannot distinguish between licensing and certification with confidence. It is 
also comparable to other dominant labour market institutions such as trade unionism for which 
the latest estimates show an average level of union membership across the EU (weighted by 
the numbers employed in the different member states) to be 23% (Fulton 2015). As a policy 
alternative to licensing, certification seems considerably more widespread in the EU (22%) 
compared to Kleiner and Krueger’s and Gittleman et al.’s (2018) estimates of 6% and 8% 
respectively. However, the former study only focuses on government certification and the later 
only on private certification, while our estimates include both government and private 
certification. Hence, these figures are not directly comparable.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
a. Who is licensed in the European Union?  
We proceed with analysing the distribution of licensed, certified and unregulated workers based 
on key demographic and employment characteristics (Table 3). We find that licensing is more 
prevalent amongst those aged 40 to 64 years, but we do not find any marked differences by 
gender. Our results further indicate that the incidence of licensing is higher amongst employees 
in the public sector (32%) and the self-employed, and least common amongst those in private 
firms (16%). This is partly expected as many occupations with high information asymmetries 
and potential to cause harm to others are found in the public sector (e.g. medical occupations, 
teachers etc.) and amongst the self-employed (which is usually correlated with the provision of 
personal services e.g. plumbers, lawyers etc.). This trend is further reflected in the distribution 
of licensing by industrial classification, where we find that licensing is most prevalent in health 
and public administration and least common in the hotel, restaurant and retail industries. With 
respect to occupational groups, the incidence of licensing is highest amongst plant and machine 
operators (35%), professionals (26%), and technicians and associated professionals (27%).  
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In the case of craft and related trades (20%) it is possible that the data is capturing the legacy 
of the guilds, the institution that for many centuries provided the main route for entry to such 
occupations in Europe, and one that shares many similarities to occupational regulation 
(Ogilvie 2014; Rostam-Afschar 2014; Epstein 1998). Unsurprisingly, the lowest proportion of 
licensed workers is found amongst occupations where information asymmetries and negative 
externalities are expected to be lowest (i.e. elementary occupations), and in occupational 
groups such as managers that perhaps lack a strong enough professional identity to organise 
and lobby for licensing. Finally, we find certification to be most widespread amongst craft and 
related trades occupations, skilled occupations in agriculture, forestry and fishing, as well as 
technicians and associated professionals, while it is more common than licensing in managerial 
occupations and less common than licensing amongst plant and machine operators.  
Turning to education, the survey asks respondents to report the highest level of educational 
attainment.iii We find licensing to be common throughout the different levels of educational 
attainment. In particular, it is common among individuals with lower secondary education 
(24.7%), post-secondary education (26.8%), and advanced research qualification (24%). 
Interestingly, we find no stark differences between licensing and certification on one hand, and 
educational attainment on the other. However, it is noteworthy that contrary to licensing and 
certification, a large proportion of unregulated workers are concentrated in the low education 
category (71%). Finally, licensing is slightly more common among union members, most likely 
driven by the higher incidence of licensing in the public sector where unionisation rates are 
commonly high. Our results are broadly in line with the characteristics of licensed workers 
observed by Kleiner and Krueger (2013) in the US, who also find a higher proportion of 
licensed workers in the public sector, amongst union members, and in the service industry.  
 
Table 3 about here. 
 
The EU-SOR asks respondents to report the minimum level of education necessary to become 
licensediv, as well as, additional entry hurdles such as examinations and work experience.  Of 
course the presence of barriers to entry in itself is neither a guarantee of high quality services 
nor a signal of occupational closure, since it is the level at which these requirements are set that 
is likely to determine such outcomes. Nevertheless, it is suggestive of the hurdles that 
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individuals have to overcome to practice the occupation vis-à-vis their unregulated 
counterparts. To gauge the barriers to entry associated with working in a licensed occupation, 
we provide estimates of the proportion of individuals that report being subject to such 
requirements (Table 4). We find passing an exam to be as widespread in the EU (affecting 
around 86% of licensed individuals) as it is in the US (affecting 85% according to Kleiner and 
Krueger). While for the majority work experience is not required (52%), over a quarter require 
work experience of more than two years. With regards to education, either lower secondary, 
upper secondary or university qualifications are required for about three quarters of those 
licensed, although the proportion of those requiring no educational credentials is not 
insignificant (19%). Interestingly, the requirement for a university degree is not as common in 
the EU as it is in the US (25% and 43% respectively). Overall, we find the restrictiveness of 
entry to licensed occupations in the EU to be comparable to that in the US in terms of the forms 
it takes, but not necessarily with respect to the proportion of licensed workers affected by them.   
 
Table 4 about here. 
 
 
Our data further provides us with information about the distribution of licensed workers across 
different member states (Table 5). Overall, the proportion of licensed workers ranges between 
14% and 33% (Column 1). We find the largest proportion of licensed individuals in Germany 
(33%), Croatia (31%), Ireland (29%) (with Slovakia, Hungary and the Netherlands following 
closely),and the smallest proportion in Sweden (15%), Latvia (15%), and Denmark (14%). 
With the exception of Ireland, the high incidence of licensing in these countries could be 
indicative of the impact that institutions associated with the Habsburg Empire have had on the 
organisation of economic activities (see for example Becker et al. 2015). We further compare 
these data on individual attainment to the number of regulated professions in the EU Database 
of Regulated Occupations (Column 3). v Interestingly, we do not find a statistically significant 
correlation between the proportion of individuals subject to licensing and the number of 
licensed occupations in each member state (r =.13, p= n.s.). For example, whilst the incidence 
of licensing within a member state might initially appear low compared to others (as measured 
by the number of occupations subject to licensing), the actual prevalence of licensing can be 
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substantial if employment in these categories is disproportionately large. We depict the 
geographical variability of the proportion of licensed workers (Figure 1). Licensing is most 
prevalent in some Central and Eastern European countries, but there is no clear difference 
between North and South. Countries with high proportion of licensing seem to be located along 
a diagonal from North-West to South-East.  
  
Table 5 about here 
Figure 1 about here 
 
6. The Wage effects of Occupational Licensing 
To examine whether licensing is associated with higher pay, we present estimates of log wage 
regressions using individual level data (Table 6). In addition to the standard human capital 
controls, industry and detailed occupational controls, country fixed effects are also included in 
the models. Even including a rich set of controls, variability in individual level licensing status 
exists because of country-occupation specific licensing regulations. In fact, the same 
occupational code might include different licensed professions in each country, each with its 
own admission rules and requirements. Such differences generate heterogeneity across 
country-occupation cells and at the individual level, as workers with the same level of 
education, experience, etc. might be subject to different licensing regulations depending on 
their specific job in each country. Clearly, moving from left to right in Table 6, we 
progressively control for exogenous variables potentially affecting wages and exploit 
variability in licensing status across workers with more similar characteristics.  
In our most basic specification, the mean wage of licensed workers is about 9.7 log points 
higher than that of unregulated workers.  The coefficient of licensing then significantly drops 
as controls are progressively included, suggesting that a large portion of the premium is coming 
from educational endowments and other labour market characteristics, rather than licensing per 
se. In our more elaborate specifications, we find that having a licence is associated with 
approximately 4% higher hourly wages (p<0.01). Such an effect is considerably lower in 
magnitude than the 18% licensing wage premium found by Kleiner and Krueger (2013) and 
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closer to the more recent estimates of 10% by Kleiner and Vorotnikov (2018) and 7% by 
Gittleman and Kleiner (2016).  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
6.2. Signalling or entry restrictions? 
What is the mechanism that generates the observed wage gap between licensed and unlicensed 
workers? Occupational licensing may affect wages by improving human capital and providing 
a credible signal to consumers. However, it may also increase wages by restricting labour 
supply. In our data, we can observe a set of workers who report to hold a certification (on top 
of their educational achievements). This certification provides a signal of additional human 
capital, without necessarily being associated with a restriction in labour supply, as it is not a 
legal requirement. Due to the restrictiveness of licensing, in a wage regression we expect the 
coefficient of the indicator variable for licensed workers to be larger than that of certified 
workers. The difference between the two provides a measure of the impact of the legally 
enforced entry restrictions in increasing the wages of licensed workers.  
The results from the wage regressions are shown in Table 7. We use the same specifications as 
in Table 6, but add an indicator variable for certification status. Interestingly, as with licensing, 
we find that certification has a positive and significant effect on wages. This is consistent with 
certification being associated with higher skills and having some signalling value in the labour 
market. However, in general, certification is associated with a smaller premium than licensing. 
In column 6, this difference is about two percentage points (0.0347, p<0.05 for certification 
and 0.0519, p<0.01 for licensing). Further, the difference between the coefficients of the 
‘licensed’ and ‘certified’ dummies captures the impact of the legal requirement to hold a 
license, which is the main difference between certification and licensing. In fact, both licensing 
and certification provide a signal of worker quality. However, licensing also restricts entry into 
specific labor markets to licensed workers and it is therefore associated with a higher wage. 
Overall, the wage gap between licensed and unregulated workers is 5.19log points, of which 
one third can be attributed to entry restrictions and two thirds to signalling (although we note 




Table 7 about here 
 
In the analysis that follows, we disaggregate the wage effects of licensing and certification by 
occupation. This enables us to conduct within-occupation comparisons of those with licenses 
and certificates on one hand, and those without at major occupation level (1-digit). The first 
column in Table 8 includes interactions of the indicator variable for licensed workers with 
indicator variables for occupational groups. The second specification (column 2) includes the 
indicator variable for certification, while the third column includes interactions of the 
certification dummy with an indicator variable for each occupation. Overall, we find that 
licensing is having a differential effect by occupation. In column 1, the effect is of highest 
magnitude for craft and related trades occupations (16 log points) as well as elementary 
occupations (13 log points), service and sales workers (7 log points), and professionals (4 log 
points). This heterogeneity is not much affected in column 2. Finally, in column 3, the 
difference between the coefficients of ‘licensed’ and ‘certified’ are very heterogeneous across 
occupations. This difference is particularly large and statistically significant for craft and 
related trades workers as well as elementary occupations. Managerial occupations are typically 
unregulated and the few licensed workers in this category tend to have lower wages than 
certified workers.  
Table 8 about here 
 
6.3 Occupational licensing and the return to education 
In line with the literature on returns to education (Becker 1993), we have shown that even after 
controlling for a large number of covariates in our wage regressions, the difference in wages 
due to education remains large. Yet, an unexplored line of enquiry in the empirical literature is 
the effect of occupational regulation on returns to education and in particular, how this varies 
between licensed, certified and unregulated workers. We address this by estimating wage 
regressions similar to our previous models allowing for group-specific returns to education. 
We split workers into three groups: elementary and lower secondary education, upper 
secondary and tertiary (non-college) education, and college or higher. In Table 9 and Figure 2, 
16 
 
we report the results we obtain when we interact the ‘licensing’ and ‘certification’ indicator 
variables with indicator variables for different levels of educational achievement. For 
unregulated workers, the average wage grows with education, particularly for those with 
college education. For licensed workers, we obtain different results. While those with 
elementary education earn significantly more than unregulated workers, the wage growth for 
licensed workers with upper-secondary education is zero. Hence, licensing seems to decrease 
the returns to secondary education relative to unregulated workers.  
The wages of workers with a college degree are significantly higher to those of workers with a 
secondary education for unregulated, certified, and licensed workers. However, wages of 
licensed workers with college education are significantly higher to those of similarly educated 
unregulated workers (the difference is 0.06, p-value 0.01). In comparison with unregulated 
workers, licensing flattens the returns to education for low levels of education, while it 
increases them for university qualifications. Estimates for certified workers show a pattern that 
is between that of unregulated and licensed workers. However, standard errors are large, and 
differences with respect to estimates for licensed workers are not statistically significant. 
Hence, we cannot precisely separate the impact of licensing and certification on the returns to 
education.  
Table 9 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
6.3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
The heterogeneity in wage premiums across occupations suggests that the linear model (1) may 
not capture some of the heterogeneous effects of licensing regulations. In fact, our results so 
far have highlighted the importance of heterogeneity in the licensing wage gap across 
occupations and educational groups. We now turn to the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, which 
does not constrain the effect of licensing to be constant for all workers, or even for workers 
within the same occupation or educational group.  
The estimated coefficients of model (2) on the two groups (licensed and non-licensed) are 
reported in Table 10, together with the mean values of each variable. The table illustrates how 
licensing distorts the relative wage of different occupational groups. Licensed professionals 
earn on average 7.2 percent more than licensed managers, licensed craft workers 3.6 percent 
less, and licensed workers in elementary occupations 19.4 percent less. The table shows a very 
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different pattern of relative wages for non-licensed workers. Non-licensed professionals earn 
5.8 percent less than non-licensed managers, non-licensed craft workers earn 31.4 percent less, 
and non-licensed workers in elementary occupations 42.8 percent less. The occupations with 
the largest differences between the two figures are ‘Professionals’, ‘Craft and related trades’, 
‘Service and sales workers’ and ‘Elementary occupations’. These differences are consistent 
with the idea that licensing confers a wage premium that is particularly large for some 
occupations. 
Table 11 describes the results of the decomposition in equation (4) based on the estimated 
coefficients. The overall difference in log wages between licensed and non-licensed workers 
(about 9 percent) can be decomposed into the part that is due to characteristics of the workers 
(composition effects) and that due to differences in regression coefficients (wage structure 
effect). The wage structure effect can be interpreted as a generalized version of the wage 
premium discussed in previous paragraphs. The composition effect accounts for 62% of the 
overall difference. Differences in occupation, age, and work experience are important 
determinants of the composition effect. The wage structure effect, due to differences in the 
estimated coefficients, accounts for about 38% of the overall effect. Differences in the 
coefficients of union membership, age, and occupation dummies are the most important 
contributors to the wage structure effect.  
 
Table 10 about here 
Table 11 about here 
 
6. Occupational Licensing and Wage Dispersion 
Our final analysis concerns the effect of licensing on the entire wage distribution, which we 
examine using the DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) semiparametric decomposition method 
(DFL). In Figure 2, we depict the distribution of log hourly wages in the EU for licensed and 
non-licensed workers. We then decompose the difference between these two distributions into 
the composition effect and the wage structure effect. In Figure 3, we show the distribution for 
licensed workers and the estimated counterfactual density that would be obtained if these 
workers had the same characteristics as their non-licensed counterparts. The composition effect 
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is equal to the difference between the two distributions. Finally, in Figure 4, we report the wage 
distribution of non-licensed workers and the same counterfactual density. The difference 
between these two distributions corresponds to the impact of licensing, holding constant the 
characteristics of workers. This is the semiparametric version of the wage structure effect 
introduced in equation (4).  
 
Figure 3 about here 
Figure 4 about here 
Figure 5 about here 
 
The results of the DFL decomposition can be used to compute statistics from the three 
distributions. In Table 12, we report the standard deviation, the variance, and the distances 
between selected quantiles. Differences in these statistics provide estimates of the composition 
and wage structure effects. The wage structure effect of licensing implies a significant increase 
in wage inequality as measured by the standard deviation of log hourly wages (2.8 log points). 
The distance between the 99th and the 1st, the 95th and the 5th, the 90th and the 10th percentiles 
is also increased by licensing. Columns 6 and 7 show that the wage structure effect leads to an 
increase in the dispersion of wages in both tails of the distribution. In line with previous results 
on mean wages, we find that the median wage is increased by the wage structure effect (column 
8). Our results generally support those of similar US studies using different sets of data and 
different methodologies (e.g. Gittleman and Kleiner 2016; Kleiner and Vorotnikov 2018).  
 
Table 12 about here 
 
7. Conclusions 
We present the first ever estimates of the prevalence and wage effects of occupational 
regulation in the EU.  We find that licensing affects about 22 percent of workers in the EU, 
albeit with significant variability across member states and occupations, leading us to conclude 
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that it is an important labour market institution in this context. We further show that in line 
with our theoretical predictions, it has an effect on wages. In particular, licensing is associated 
with an aggregate wage premium of about 4% after accounting for observable characteristics 
of the workers, country and occupation fixed effects. This figure is somewhat lower than 
current US estimates. Overall, our analysis attributes approximately one third of the licensing 
wage gap to entry restrictions (associated with the monopoly effect of licensing), and the 
remaining to signalling.  
We further present the first systematic analysis of its heterogeneous effect by occupation and 
by level of educational attainment.  With regards to the former, licensing distorts wages 
differentially by occupation, possibly indicative of the varying degree to which occupations 
can extract monopoly rents in the market. Similarly, licensing compresses the returns to 
education for low educated individuals but increases the growth in the return to education for 
those with university degrees and above. Moreover, licensing disproportionately benefits those 
at the top of the income distribution, increasing the dispersion of wages. As such, occupational 
licensing differs from unionization, which is known to reduce wage dispersion. Overall, future 
studies of occupational licensing will benefit by incorporating these heterogeneous effects into 
their analyses.  
We also account for the possible effect of certifications that are not legally required to practice 
an occupation but may signal the existence of labour market skills not fully captured by 
conventional education. Our estimates are in line with the most recent findings in the US in 
that certification is also associated with a wage premium, but not of comparable magnitude to 
that of licensing. In that sense, certification is perhaps a useful policy alternative in that it 
improves the skills of practitioners, signals the existence of a minimum standard to consumers 
while allowing them to choose whether they are willing to pay the premium associated with 
using a certified practitioner.  
A key novelty of our approach is our ability to estimate the incidence of regulation based on 
self-reported measures of regulation status rather than rely on inferences from occupational 
classifications. However, the nature of our data does not allow us to rule out the possibility of 
selection bias on unobservables hence we interpret the results as descriptive rather than casual 
evidence. Nevertheless, the limitations of the current study open up fruitful avenues for future 
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Table 1. Comparison of characteristics of EU workers in the Survey of Occupational Licensing and in the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (civilian 
employment) 
 
Mean proportion of workers   EU-SOR Data Eurostat data difference 
by educational attainment:         
  Less than primary, primary and 
lower secondary education (levels 
0-2) 
0.169 0.183 -0.014 
  Upper secondary and post-
secondary non-tertiary education 
(levels 3 and 4) 
0.439 0.481 -0.042 
  Tertiary education (levels 5-8) 0.392 0.332 0.060 
         
by gender Male 0.542 0.540 0.002 
         
by age From 15 to 39 years 0.436 0.427 0.009 
  From 40 to 64 years 0.543 0.550 -0.007 
  65 years or over 0.021 0.023 -0.003 
         
by type of employment Employees 0.851 0.850 0.001 
  Self-employed persons with 
employees (employers) 
0.043 0.042 0.001 
  Self-employed persons without 
employees (own-account workers) 
0.105 0.108 -0.002 
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by industry Agriculture 0.037 0.046 -0.009 
  Manufacturing and construction 0.225 0.240 -0.015 
  Education and health 0.225 0.185 0.040 
  Trade 0.211 0.267 -0.056 
  Finance and professional services 
and other services 
0.225 0.194 0.031 
  Public administration 0.078 0.069 0.009 
          
by occupation Managers 0.100 0.060 0.040 
  Professionals 0.276 0.188 0.088 
  Technicians and associate 
professionals 
0.158 0.158 0.000 
  Clerical support workers 0.096 0.097 -0.001 
  Service and sales workers 0.140 0.167 -0.027 
  Skilled agricultural, forestry and 
fishery  
0.016 0.039 -0.022 
  Crafts and related workers 0.107 0.116 -0.009 
  Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 
0.051 0.074 -0.022 
  Elementary occupations 0.055 0.092 -0.037 
          





Table 2. The prevalence of occupational licensing in 
the European Union. 
   
  Proportion Std. 
Error 
 
Licensed 0.219 0.0048  
Certified 0.217 0.0049  
Unregulated 0.564 0.0058  
Note: the table reports the proportion of licensed, certified, and unregulated workers. 
The proportions of licensed and certified workers include individuals in the process of 





Table 3. Proportion of licensed, certified, and unregulated workers by worker 
characteristics.   
 Licensed Certified Unregulated 
Gender    
Female 0.218 0.202 0.580 
Male 0.220 0.230 0.551 
 
Age    
From 15 to 39 years 0.195 0.205 0.600 
From 40 to 64 years 0.239 0.224 0.537 
65 years or over 0.200 0.286 0.514 
    
Employment status    
Employee in a private firm 0.159 0.217 0.624 
Employee in public/non-profit 
sector 0.322 0.217 0.462 
Self-employed with employees 0.241 0.213 0.545 
Self-employed without employees 0.220 0.217 0.563 
    
Occupation    
Managers 0.127 0.210 0.663 
Professionals 0.263 0.229 0.508 
Technicians and associate 
professionals 0.271 0.236 0.493 
Clerical support workers 0.145 0.169 0.686 
Service and sales workers 0.218 0.214 0.568 
Skilled agricultural, forestry and 
fishing 0.160 0.239 0.602 
Craft and related trades workers 0.199 0.268 0.533 
Plant and machine operators and 
assemblers 0.349 0.176 0.475 
Elementary occupations 0.105 0.153 0.742 
    
Industry    
    Agriculture (A)            0.141       0.211 0.649 
    Manufacturing of products (B, C) 0.128     0.228 0.644 
    Construction or energy  (D, E, F) 0.213     0.268 0.519 
    Wholesale or retail trade 0.106     0.199 0.695 
    Hotels and restaurants (I) 0.096     0.206 0.698 
    Transportation and communication  0.267     0.212 0.520 
    Finance, real estate (K, L) 0.242     0.217 0.541 
    Public administration (O) 0.349     0.198 0.453 
    Education (P) 0.271     0.226 0.503 
    Health and social work (Q)             0.367     0.196 0.438 
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    Professional services              0.209     0.219 0.571 
    Cultural activities         0.148     0.210 0.641 
 
Education    
Primary 0.123 0.165 0.712 
Lower secondary 0.247 0.286 0.467 
Upper secondary 0.209 0.208 0.583 
Post-secondary 0.268 0.211 0.521 
University 
(undergraduate/postgraduate) 0.215 0.204 0.580 
PhD/advanced search qualification 0.240 0.163 0.597 
    
Trade union membership    
Yes 0.280 0.224 0.496 
No 0.201 0.214 0.585 
    
Source: EU Survey of Regulated Occupations. Civilian employed population age 15 or older. 





















Table 4. Requirements to obtain a license.  
  
Proportion of Licensed Workers 
subject to the specific requirement Std. error 
Specific requirement:   
Entry examination  0.864 0.009 
Educational requirement:   
No requirement 0.191 0.010 
Primary education 0.024 0.003 
Lower secondary 0.209 0.011 
Upper secondary 0.279 0.011 
Post-secondary education 0.046 0.006 
University 0.247 0.011 
PHD/ adv. research 0.005 0.001 
Experience requirement: 
  
No work experience is/was required 0.524 0.013 
Up to a year 0.094 0.006 
More than 1 year up to 2 years 0.094 0.007 
Longer than 2 years 0.288 0.012 
Source: EU Survey of Regulated Occupations. Civilian employed population age 15 or older. 




















Std. error       
(2)       
Number of 
Licensed 
Occupationsb   
(3)                 
Germany 0.329 0.017 67 
Croatia 0.312 0.018 210 
Ireland 0.293 0.019 63 
Slovakia 0.268 0.016 308 
Hungary 0.262 0.016 353 
Netherlands 0.246 0.016 80 
Czech Republic 0.244 0.015 351 
Austria 0.222 0.015 144 
Greece 0.218 0.016 n/a 
Romania 0.217 0.018 132 
Bulgaria 0.213 0.017 98 
Luxemburg 0.210 0.020 21 
Poland 0.205 0.014 345 
Slovenia 0.202 0.015 125 
United Kingdom 0.195 0.015 103 
Italy 0.193 0.015 165 
Estonia 0.192 0.014 98 
Cyprus 0.185 0.021 96 
Lithuania 0.175 0.013 70 
Malta 0.172 0.019 n/a 
Finland 0.167 0.013 127 
Belgium 0.166 0.014 111 
Spain 0.166 0.015 107 
Portugal 0.165 0.014 202 
France 0.160 0.013 238 
Sweden 0.153 0.013 21 
Latvia 0.151 0.012 266 
Denmark 0.140               0.012       149 
a Source: EU Survey of Regulated Occupations. Civilian employed population age 15 or older.  
bSource: EU Database of Regulated Occupations.  





Table 6. Coefficients from log wage regressions. 
       
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Licensed 0.0967*** 0.0531*** 0.0453*** 0.0415*** 0.0365** 0.0402*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0149) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0148) 
Union  0.0381** 0.00567 0.0149 0.0123 0.0119 
  (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0156) 
Male  0.174*** 0.173*** 0.165*** 0.148*** 0.149*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0139) 
Age  0.0104*** 0.00668*** 0.00636*** 0.00627*** 0.00632*** 
  (0.000682) (0.000793) (0.000761) (0.000735) (0.000724) 
Lower secondary education (usually age 
11-15)  0.141*** 0.133*** 0.0926** 0.0841* 0.0864* 
  (0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0433) (0.0438) (0.0443) 
Upper secondary education (usually age 
16-19)  0.249*** 0.235*** 0.160*** 0.151*** 0.155*** 
  (0.0424) (0.0430) (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0413) 
Post-secondary education (not 
university)  0.313*** 0.297*** 0.182*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 
  (0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0471) (0.0473) (0.0481) 
University (undergraduate and post-
graduate)  0.578*** 0.569*** 0.378*** 0.358*** 0.354*** 
  (0.0429) (0.0435) (0.0426) (0.0429) (0.0433) 
PHD/ advanced research qualification  0.800*** 0.810*** 0.583*** 0.577*** 0.570*** 
  (0.0537) (0.0550) (0.0544) (0.0541) (0.0542) 
Experience   0.0179*** 0.0151*** 0.0145*** 0.0141*** 
   (0.00240) (0.00233) (0.00231) (0.00225) 
Experience2/1,000   -0.313*** -0.270*** -0.260*** -0.253*** 
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   (0.0729) (0.0711) (0.0702) (0.0682) 
Employee in public sector or non-profit    -0.000500 0.0253 0.0255 
    (0.0138) (0.0189) (0.0185) 
Self-employed with employees    0.182*** 0.194*** 0.202*** 
    (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0528) 
Self-employed without employees    -0.0653* -0.0464 -0.0434 
    (0.0392) (0.0385) (0.0362) 
Country f.e?  yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation controls?    yes yes  
Industry controls?     yes yes 
Detailed occupation controls?      yes 
Observations 16,067 16,027 15,952 15,952 15,952 15,796 
R-Squared 0.003 0.668 0.675 0.699 0.706 0.710 
 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. Omitted indicator variables: Primary education, Employee in private firm or business.  Individuals in the process of obtaining a license 
are classified as unregulated.  




Table 7. Coefficients from log wage regressions (licensing and certification). 
     
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
licensed 0.116*** 0.0673*** 0.0596*** 0.0533*** 0.0481*** 0.0519*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0154) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0154) 
certified 0.0734*** 0.0476*** 0.0478*** 0.0374** 0.0359** 0.0347** 
 (0.0256) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0163) (0.0161) 
union  0.0360** 0.00356 0.0138 0.0112 0.0108 
  (0.0158) (0.0156) (0.0160) (0.0156) (0.0156) 
male  0.172*** 0.172*** 0.164*** 0.147*** 0.148*** 
  (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0136) (0.0135) (0.0139) 
age  0.0103*** 0.00654*** 0.00625*** 0.00617*** 0.00623*** 
  (0.000671) (0.000783) (0.000753) (0.000728) (0.000717) 
Lower secondary education (usually age 11-15)  0.138*** 0.130*** 0.0903** 0.0820* 0.0848* 
  (0.0462) (0.0466) (0.0432) (0.0437) (0.0443) 
Upper secondary education (usually age 16-19)  0.247*** 0.234*** 0.159*** 0.150*** 0.154*** 
  (0.0425) (0.0430) (0.0406) (0.0409) (0.0414) 
Post-secondary education (not university)  0.312*** 0.296*** 0.182*** 0.174*** 0.173*** 
  (0.0490) (0.0491) (0.0471) (0.0473) (0.0482) 
University (undergraduate and post-graduate)  0.577*** 0.568*** 0.378*** 0.359*** 0.355*** 
  (0.0430) (0.0435) (0.0426) (0.0430) (0.0434) 
PHD/ advanced research qualification  0.802*** 0.812*** 0.586*** 0.580*** 0.575*** 
  (0.0539) (0.0553) (0.0546) (0.0543) (0.0545) 
Experience   0.0179*** 0.0151*** 0.0145*** 0.0141*** 
   (0.00241) (0.00234) (0.00232) (0.00225) 
Experience2/1,000   -0.311*** -0.269*** -0.259*** -0.252*** 
   (0.0734) (0.0715) (0.0705) (0.0685) 
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Employee in public sector or non-profit    -0.00256 0.0239 0.0243 
    (0.0139) (0.0190) (0.0186) 
Self-employed with employees    0.182*** 0.194*** 0.203*** 
    (0.0527) (0.0527) (0.0528) 
Self-employed without employees    -0.0663* -0.0470 -0.0439 
    (0.0392) (0.0385) (0.0362) 
Country f.e?  yes yes yes yes yes 
Occupation controls?    yes yes  
Industry controls?     yes yes 
Detailed occupation controls?      yes 
Observations 16,067 16,027 15,952 15,952 15,952 15,796 
R-squared 0.004 0.668 0.676 0.699 0.706 0.711 
Licensed - Certified 0.0425 0.0197 0.0118 0.0159 0.0122 0.0172 
s.e. (0.0297) (0.0199) (0.0194) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0188) 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. Omitted indicator variables: Primary education, Employee in private firm or business. .Individuals in the process of obtaining a license 






Table 8. Coefficients from log wage regressions (licensing and certification) with interactions. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
licensed x managers -0.0933 -0.0842 -0.0788 
 (0.0680) (0.0682) (0.0695) 
licensed x professionals 0.0446* 0.0561** 0.0610** 
 (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.0260) 
licensed x Technicians and associate professionals -0.0031 0.0108 0.0118 
 (0.0314) (0.0323) (0.0348) 
licensed x Clerical support workers 0.0423 0.0517 0.0536 
 (0.0495) (0.0496) (0.0502) 
licensed x Service and sales workers 0.0747** 0.0868*** 0.0852*** 
 (0.0302) (0.0306) (0.0320) 
licensed x Skilled agricultural 0.0144 0.0260 0.0190 
 (0.2436) (0.2445) (0.2407) 
licensed x Craft and related trades workers 0.1575*** 0.1716*** 0.1771*** 
 (0.0383) (0.0388) (0.0409) 
licensed x Plant and machine operators -0.0560 -0.0438 -0.0657 
 (0.0538) (0.0540) (0.0561) 
licensed x Elementary occupations 0.1292 0.1358 0.1076 
 (0.0831) (0.0829) (0.0842) 
certified  0.0369**  
  (0.0164)  
certified x managers   0.0662 
   (0.0564) 
certified x professionals   0.0530 
   (0.0358) 
certified x Technicians and associate professionals  0.032273 
   (0.0349) 
certified x Clerical support workers   0.0495 
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   (0.0481) 
certified x Service and sales workers   0.0349 
   (0.0462) 
certified x Skilled agricultural   0.0155 
   (0.2166) 
certified x Craft and related trades workers   0.0547 
   (0.0383) 
certified x Plant and machine operators   -0.0325 
   (0.0436) 
certified x Elementary occupations   -0.1246* 
   (0.0730) 
Difference between licensing and certification:   
Managers  -0.1211* -0.1449* 
  (0.0692) (0.0804) 
Professionals  0.0192 0.0080 
  (0.0283) (0.0379) 
Technicians and associate professionals  -0.0260 -0.0304 
  (0.0328) (0.0367) 
Clerical support workers  0.0148 0.0041 
  (0.0515) (0.0639) 
Service and sales workers  0.0500 0.0503 
  (0.0323) (0.0467) 
Skilled agricultural  -0.0109 0.0035 
  (0.2450) (0.3122) 
Craft and related trades workers  0.1348*** 0.1224*** 
  (0.0398) (0.0453) 
Plant and machine operators  -0.0806 -0.0332 
  -0.0552 (0.0602) 
Elementary occupations  0.0990 0.2322** 
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  (0.0844) -0.1012 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. The coefficients of education, occupation, industry, work status, gender, union indicators, age, experience, and experience squared 











Licensed x Upper secondary education and Post-secondary education (not 
university) -0.0966** 
 (0.0418) 
Licensed x University education (and higher) -0.0557 
 (0.0435) 
Certified x Upper secondary education and Post-secondary education (not 
university) -0.0521 
 (0.0436) 
Certified x University education (and higher) -0.0391 
 (0.0484) 
Upper secondary education and Post-secondary education (not 
university)  0.120*** 
 (0.0253) 
University education (and higher) 0.314*** 
  
Country f.e? yes 
Occupation controls?  
Industry controls? yes 
Detailed occupation controls?        yes 
Observations 15,795 
R-squared 0.709 
Note: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. See Figure 1 for graphical representation. Omitted 
indicator variables: Primary and lower secondary education, Employee in private firm or business. The 
coefficients of occupation, industry, work status, gender, union indicators, age, experience, and experience 
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squared are not reported. Individuals in the process of obtaining a license or certification are classified as 





Table 10. Means and regression coefficients from log wage regressions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Licensed 
Non-
licensed Licensed Licensed 
Non-
licensed Non-licensed 
  Means Means coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
union 0.323 0.236 -0.033 0.026 0.026 0.019 
age 43.531 41.512 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 
Experience 12.706 10.833 0.013 0.003 0.015 0.003 
Experience2/1,000 0.274 0.224 -0.133 0.079 -0.300 0.087 
male 0.562 0.534 0.120 0.025 0.152 0.015 
Education (primary education omitted):       
Lower secondary education (usually age 11-15) 0.152 0.140 0.048 0.067 0.072 0.048 
Upper secondary education (usually age 16-19) 0.354 0.365 0.096 0.062 0.149 0.045 
Post-secondary education (not university) 0.076 0.064 0.086 0.090 0.186 0.051 
University (undergraduate and post-graduate) 0.382 0.377 0.342 0.069 0.343 0.047 
PHD/ advanced research qualification 0.023 0.022 0.536 0.090 0.569 0.061 
Occupation (managers omitted):       
Professionals 0.320 0.260 0.072 0.064 -0.058 0.028 
Technicians and associate professionals 0.190 0.145 -0.031 0.067 -0.142 0.030 
Clerical support workers 0.061 0.109 -0.113 0.078 -0.239 0.030 
Service and sales workers 0.149 0.142 -0.145 0.066 -0.336 0.031 
Skilled agricultural 0.009 0.014 -0.334 0.230 -0.383 0.085 
Craft and related trades workers 0.099 0.111 -0.036 0.074 -0.314 0.032 
Plant and machine operators 0.086 0.046 -0.185 0.091 -0.275 0.033 
Elementary occupations 0.026 0.062 -0.194 0.097 -0.428 0.041 
Industry (agriculture omitted):       
Manufacturing of products 0.079 0.147 0.203 0.082 0.271 0.060 
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Construction or energy 0.082 0.085 0.228 0.087 0.304 0.063 
Wholesale or retail trade 0.052 0.137 0.107 0.088 0.188 0.061 
Hotels and restaurants 0.015 0.037 -0.014 0.116 0.076 0.075 
Transportation and communication 0.069 0.056 0.249 0.090 0.323 0.063 
Finance, real estate 0.040 0.041 0.224 0.093 0.306 0.069 
Public administration 0.147 0.073 0.182 0.082 0.195 0.062 
Education 0.135 0.104 0.116 0.086 0.158 0.066 
Health and social work 0.221 0.108 0.097 0.082 0.204 0.063 
Professional services (e.g. legal) 0.122 0.140 0.117 0.084 0.263 0.062 
Cultural activities (including sport) 0.020 0.041 -0.009 0.106 0.088 0.066 
Work status (employee in private firm omitted):       
Employee in public sector or non-profit 0.498 0.295 0.023 0.033 0.028 0.023 
Self-employed with employees 0.035 0.033 0.182 0.092 0.208 0.062 
Self-employed without employees 0.083 0.081 0.010 0.061 -0.059 0.046 
       
Note: The table reports the mean of the variables for licensed and non-licensed workers in columns 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 report the coefficients and standard errors of a wage regression 
for licensed workers.  Columns 5 and 6 report the coefficients and standard errors of a wage regression for non-licensed workers. Individuals in the process of obtaining a license or 










Table 11. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results.    
     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Estimated values s.e. t Proportion of total 
Differential     
Predicted log wage licensed 2.1710 0.0192 112.79  
Predicted log wage non-licensed 2.0766 0.0108 191.57  
Difference 0.0944 0.0221 4.27 100% 
     
Explained composition effects 
attributable to 
    
Union 0.0022 0.0017 1.32  
Age 0.0141 0.0033 4.24  
Work experience 0.0130 0.0027 4.73  
Gender 0.0043 0.0026 1.69  
Education 0.0035 0.0042 0.84  
Occupation 0.0093 0.0048 1.95  
Industry 0.0028 0.0056 0.5  
Work status 0.0060 0.0048 1.26  
Country 0.0032 0.0157 0.2   
Total 0.0585 0.0183 3.2 62% 
     
Unexplained wage structure effect 
attributable to 
    
Union -0.0191 0.0103 -1.85  
Age -0.1656 0.0660 -2.51  
Work experience 0.0230 0.0272 0.85  
Gender -0.0181 0.0168 -1.08  
Education -0.0308 0.0766 -0.4  
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Occupation 0.1405 0.0624 2.25  
Industry -0.0765 0.0944 -0.81  
Work status 0.0025 0.0223 0.11  
Country -0.0070 0.0374 -0.19  
Constant 0.1871 0.1641 1.14   
Total 0.0359 0.0150 2.4 38% 
Note: The table uses non-licensed workers as reference group. The estimated coefficients and mean values of the variables are 
























Table 12. Licensing and wage inequality: aggregate decomposition results.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 sd var p99-p1 p95-p5 p90-p10 p50-p5 p95-p50 Median 
Licensed workers 0.8587 0.7373 3.7806 2.8323 2.2314 1.4093 1.4230 1.9816 
Non-licensed workers 0.8456 0.7150 3.6706 2.7061 2.2126 1.3481 1.3581 1.8405 
Counter factual 0.8738 0.7635 3.8305 2.8798 2.2601 1.4193 1.4605 1.8717 
         
Total effect 0.0131 0.0224 0.1099 0.1262 0.0187 0.0612 0.0650 0.1412 
Composition effect -0.0151 -0.0261 -0.0500 -0.0475 -0.0287 -0.0100 -0.0375 0.1099 
Wage structure effect 0.0282 0.0485 0.1599 0.1737 0.0475 0.0712 0.1024 0.0312 
Note: DFL decomposition results. The explanatory variables include union, education, occupation, industry, work status, country indicators, age, experience, experience squared. Individuals in the process of 






















Figure 2. The wage effects of licensing and certification by education. 
 
Note: Figure reports the wage effects (computed using estimates in Table 9) of licensing and certification relative to 
unregulated workers for workers with elementary or lower secondary education, upper secondary and tertiary (non-
college) education, and college or higher. The wage effect of unregulated workers with elementary education is used as 
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i The number of interviews is about 1,000 for each country, but 500 for smaller countries like Cyprus, 
Luxembourg, and Malta. 
ii For all countries surveyed, a national weighting procedure using marginal and intercellular weighting was 
carried out based on a comparison between the sample and the universe. The universe description was 
derived from Eurostat population data or from national statistics offices. In all countries, gender, age, region 
and size of locality were introduced in the iteration procedure. For international weighting (i.e. EU averages), 
the official population figures as provided by Eurostat or national statistic offices were used. 
iii The educational attainment level is coded according to the International Standard Classification of Education 
(ISCED 2011) for each member state (for more information see UNESCO site: 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx).  
iv Respondents were asked “Was a minimum level of education required in order to apply for this license?” 
responses were coded according to the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 2011) for 
each Member state (for more information see UNESCO site: 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/Pages/international-standard-classification-of-education.aspx). A ‘no 
minimum level of education required’ category was included in the responses.  
v The database is compiled and maintained by the European Commission and it is accessible via this link: 
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/regprof/index.cfm?action=map_regulations 
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